This article introduces a paradigm for the calculation of an alternative solution to the Nash equilibrium applicable to the class of games G and develops mathematical methods for the analysis of these games.
Introduction
The theory of correlated equilibria developed by Aumann and Schelling, allows the calculation of the solution of a game, using a stratagem, which makes asymmetric and incomplete information provided separately to the players self-enforced, in other words stable, according to a certain denition of equilibrium.
On the contrary our theory is based on the concept of information deterrent that, as we shall see in the next section, is incomplete but symmetrical and provided jointly to all the players.
The basic idea is to give all players an extra information at the beginning of the game, which is used by them to recalculate the expected payo.
The concepts of deterrent and temporized equilibrium, are the basis of our discussion.
For both we will provide a general and rigorous denition. In particular, the concept of equilibrium will be seen as a characterization of the equilibrium for a nite, noncooperative and non-zero-sum game.
In the next section we will mathematically prove the existence of the equilibrium point and provide methodological tools for the calculation of the temporized solution; we will discuss the properties of this point with regard to the concepts of Pareto-optimality and superrationality.
As an example of application of our theory, we include the solution to the prisoner's dilemma using the concept of temporized equilibrium.
Finally, the interpretations and applications of concepts exposed, will be treated in the concluding section of this article.
Definitions and terminology
In this section we dene the fundamental ideas and we point out the terminology that will be used in the treatment. We will make reference to the concepts of nite, nonzero-sum game in strategic form, mixed strategy, payo function and Nash equilibrium, according to the denitions furnished in [1] .
To relieve the notation, we will use the appellative "game G" referring to nite, nonzero-sum games in strategic form, in which for every player, the coecients of the non linear terms of the utility function after rearranging some terms, are all positive or all negative or all zero.
As we will see subsequently, this last property, that may appear restrictive, will allow us to describe in appropriated way a huge class of games.
Further more we will use indierently the notations fj and fj "
to indicate the utility function for the player j.
We now dene the concept of deterrent, trying to make it as much general as possible to provide a denition able to nimbly embrace concepts relative to dierent elds.
Denition 2.1 (Deterrent) . Piece of information, indication, tip or public consciousness, simmetric and incomplete, that is known to all the players of a G game at the beginning of the game, that induce the players to reconsider their utility functions in order to downsize the target set of such functions and then calculate the solutions of the game.
It is evident that the presence of the deterrent aects the players perception of the game. This concept is fundamental in our theory, in fact it represents the element for which the players reconsider their strategic choices for a temporized equilibrium. In the following we dene the idea of temporized equilibrium.
Denition 2.2 (Temporized Equilibrium). A temporized equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, for which the equilibrium strategies identify a point on the hyperplane H dened by the following system:
represents the utility function for the player j, r ∈ N indicates the number of players, kj ∈ R + are the proportionality coecients and nj identify the available actions for every player j. The x j s are the porbability distributions assigned by the player j to the action s, for which the following properties hold:
From 2.2 we understand that the temporized equilibrium inherits the stability features from the denition of Nash equilibrium and adds to it more specic connotates.
Denition 2.3 (Variables associated to the j-th player). We dene variables associated to the j-th player, the probability distributions x j s and we dene functions that take as argument the variables associated to the j-th player the functions fj "
hj "
in which the arguments are expressed exclusively in terms of variables associated to the player j, that follow the relations hj resulting from the calculus of the components of the hyperplane H. Obviously the subsequent holds:
In the folowing sections, we will justify the denitions given and we will build our theory mathematically.
Existence of the temporized equilibrium
We now lay the foundations on which out theory is based. First we enunciate adn demonstrate a theorem of general validity, that is necessary to our demosntration of the existence of the temporized equilibrium. We will build an hyperplane that will be used to give a charaterisation and geometrical accuracy to the solution.
Theorem 3.1. In every game G with r players, in which every player j ∈ [1, r] ⊂ N can make nj actions, exist r coecients kj ∈ R + that makes the components of the hyperplane H, identied by the following system, continous:
Proof. Let us demonstrate the theorem in case of two player, r = 2, each one having n1 = n2 = 2 actions. The utility functions are: f1(x 1
; the bimatrix associated to the game is:
a21, b21 a22, b22
C A
Let's write the hyperplane H with the utility functions of the game:
H :
Let us suppose that k1 = 1 and call A = max {a11, a12, a21, a22} and B = max {b11, b12, b21, b22}, solve the system, obtaining, after a little calculation, the equation of the hyperplane H:
In order to guarantee that every component of the equation (3.1) is continuous, it is sucient to set to zero the coecient of the non-linear term. To do this it is necessary to solve the following equation:
In case A or B are zero, it is possible to sum a quantity u = 0 to the coecient of U before the calculus and then subtract them at the end. If the identity holds:
then by denition k2 = 1.
The extension of this demonstration to generic G games is trivial, in fact it is sucient to nd the values of the coecient kj that make the non-linear terms of the hyperplan components equations null. If all the components of H are continuos ∀kj ∈ R + , then by
The number of players and of the possibile actions for each player aect the number of veriable in the system that ramain unsolved, that represent the number of dimensions of the hyperplane that we have already discussed. For H holds the following:
Proof. Every player has an utility function, so the system H has r equations. To every action is associated a probability function, the number of variables in the function fj is ni − 1 for every player i. At the total we have to sum the variable t and then the variables that remain parametrically expressed are d(H) = P r i=1 (ni − 1) + 1 − r. This value represents the number of dimensions of the hyperplane. Now that we have terminated with the description of the hyperplane H, by expressing it as a a function of its components and derving information on the number of dimensions, we observe how this structure properties inuence the player's utility functions characteristics.
Proposition 3.3. The continuity of the hyperplane components H is a sucient condition for the continuity of the player's utility functions kjfj calculted on H.
Proof. The utility functions fj are j grade polynoms and so they are obviously continous.
So the functions fj continuity calculated on H that take as arguments the variables x j s associated to the j-th player, depends exclusively on the continuity of the hyperplane components.
By contruction of the hyperplane H, we know that it is that geometrical place in which the utility functions (moltiplied by the coecient kj) are the same. Let us use the denition 2.3S to enunciate the following: Theorem 3.4. Stationary points of the utility functions fj calculated on the hyperplane H, that take as arguments the variables x j s associated to the j-th player, are coincident
Proof. By theorem 3.1, the hyperplane H is the place of points in which the functions kjfj are equivalent. By denition 2.3, we can express the fj "
as exclusive functions of the variables related to the player j, calculated on the hyperplane, fj "
, without changing the properties, (hj is a continous function ∀j ∈ [1, r] ). We now can conclude that H is the place of points in wich the functions kjfj "
are equivalent, for this reason aven the stationary points of such functions coincide. By the following derivation rule:
Now, by the denition of stationary point, we write from the previous:
Since the coecients kj > 0, the equation has the same solutions of the following:
x j 1 . . . x j n j −1 ""i = 0, and that holds for every j. We have demonstrated that the stationary points of the functions kjfj "
coincide ∀j and so, by the transitive property, the stationary point of the fj "
We know that the components of the utility functions are continous and dened on a compact set (Def. 2.2), so the following holds:
Corollary 3.5. The maxima of the utility functions fj "
, calculated on H, dene univocally a point on such hyperplane.
Proof. By contruction the functions kjfj calculated on the hyperplane H, are continous and dened on a compact set, since x j s ∈ [0, 1] ∀s, j, by the Weierstrass' theorem they admit an absolute maximum M ∈ H. By the theorem 3.1 the kjfj(M ) have the same value ∀j. By the previous theorem, we know that the kjfj have the same stationary points, so M is a stationary point for all the kjfj. Let us use the following property of the funtion argmax: argmax(kf (x)) = argmax(f (x)), with k > 0 that allow us to say that, maximize the kjfj is equivalent to maximize the fj. As we did in the demonstration of the theorem 3.4 we can express the fj as function of the variables associated to the player j, without alter the properties of such functions and so we can conclude that maximize the fj is equivalent to maximize the fj "
. We apply the function argmax a to these and so we obtain the coordinates of the maximum point, expressed in cartesian coordinates, since H is dened as a compact subspace of the Euclidean space E r :
. . x r nr −1 )))´∈ H that is the geometrical point whose coordinates are the maximum point of the utility functions fj "
that take as arguments the variables x j s associated to the player j, ∀j.
We have built the mathematical structures that will allow us dto demonstrate the existence of the temporized equilibrium. Let us enunciate the cardinal theorem for our theory and, give a demonstration that uses that instruments just exposed.
Theorem 3.6. For every G game exsits a temporized equilibrium.
Proof. This theorem is a direct consequence of the previous theorems. For every G game hold the theorem 3.1, that states the continuity of the hyperplane H components, that, by the proposition 3.3 is a sucient condition for the continuity of the fj calculated on H; by theorem 3.4 we know that the players' utility functions, fj "
, calculated on the hyperplane have the same stationary points and more on by the corollary 3.5 we know that the maximum of the fj "
We need now to verify the stability of the point M , for concluding that it is an equilibrium point. We call fj
the value of fj in the point M . It is evident that the relation holds:
with l that represents a generic function on the variables
; this means that a temporized equilibrium is a Nash equilibrium, in which the utility that the player J can obtain by playing M is grather or equal than the utility that he could obtain by playing any other strategy, and this holds ∀j. So the point M is stable and we can say that the coordinates of M are the temporized equilibrium proles of every player, for a G game.
We have shown that in every G game exists a temporized equilibrium; starting from the theorem 3.6 demonstration, we can get some properties of the equilibrium point.
We will treat in this section the Pareto-optimality, while we leave to the next section the considerations about superrationality.
3.1. Pareto-optimality. A fundamental characteristic of the temporized equilibrium is Pareto-optimality. We have a paretian optimus (alternatively said allocative eciency) when it is not possible any reorganization of the payo distribution that can increase everone conditions. In such situations, the utility of a player can be increased only decreasing the utility of some other players; this means that no player can increase his condition if none decrease his own one.
The Pareto-optimality property depends directle on the theorem 3.5; since the point M is the maximum point for the utility function of every player and, the strategies prole by which every player choose the equilibrium is possible, it is evident that the temporized equilibrium is the best choice that every player can make in the game, according with the denition of Pareto-optimality.
Superrationality
Superrationality is an alternative way of thinking. The rst assumption is that the answer to a symmetric problem will be the same for all the superrational player. Further more this equality will be taken in consideration before knowing what the strategy will be. The strategy will be found by maximizing the payo for every player, assuming that every player will use the same strategy. Since the superrational player knows that the other superrational players will do the same thing, whatever it would be, there will be only two choices (in the case of a 2 × 2 game). Both will cooperate or both will defect respect to the value of the superrational answer.
In the calculus of the temporized equilibria every player assume that even the other players will use the deterrent information to calculate the impact that it has on the game e only after that he makes the choice, without any agreements with the other players or further hypothesis about their rationality. The stability of the temporized equilibrium is
given by the fact that it is a Nash equilibrium, Pareto-optimal. So, even if the superrationality is dierent from the classical concepts of game theory, the research of temporized equilibrium in symmetric games brings to the same results that one can obtain using the denition of superrationality.
Let us see two theorems applicable to symmetric games that will allow us to conclude that the superrational behaviour Vcould be obtained by rational players, according to the denition given by games theory, using the temporized equilibria theory; but before that let us start with a consideration that holds for non cooperative games:
Remark 4.1. Every nite, non zero sum and symmetric game, is a G game.
Thank to this remark, we can expose the following:
Corollary 4.2. In every symmetric G game, for which the hypothesis of the theorem 3.1 hold, the coecients kj are all equal to 1.
Proof. The bimatrix associated to a symmetric game is anti-symmetric. Using the dispositions of theorem 3.1 it results evident that by equalling the utility functions of the players and reordering the terms, the coecients of the non linear terms go to zero, since the coecients of the bimatrix are the same for every player for every value kj. It follows that, by denition, when the coecients of the non linear terms go to zero, the kj have value 1.
As direct consequence of the corrolary just exposed, we express the following theorem that will be fundamental for the considerations that we will make at the end of this section, in relation with the concept of superrationality.
Theorem 4.3. In every symmetric G game, the temporized equilibrium strategy is the same for every player.
Proof. By the corollary 4.2 we know that the coecients kj in a symmetric G game are equal to 1, so kjfj = fj. On the hyperplane H the functions kjfj are equivalent ∀j, so in our case the functions fj are all equals ∀j. By the theorem 3.4 the stationary points of the fj coincide and more on the values of the fj in such points are the same ∀j. Since the fj are continous, one of the common stationary point is an absolute maximum M * . Once again it is possible to express the fj as exclusive function of the variables associated to the player j. After this operation, it holds the condition for which the fj "
are identical. At this point by applying the argmax function to every fj "
, we obtain that the argmax " fj "
are identical ∀j and so by the theorem 3.5 the players have an equilibrium strategy that uniquely individuate a point M * on H, that we have demostrate that it is the same for all.
In the characteristics of the temporized equilibrium for symmetric G game, stands the demonstration of the statements made at the beginning of this section. In fact, since the equilibrium strategy is the same for all te players and the value of the game at the temporized equilibrium is Pareto-optimal, the aswer of the rational players is the one that would be given by superrational players to the same game.
In the next section we will show, in a classical game theory example, a practical case of temporized equilibrium calculus, that should clarify the aspects related to superrationality.
Temporized solution to the prisoner's dilemma
The prisoner's dilemma is a G game example very famous in literature, in which two criminals are accused of robbery. The detectives arrest both, close them in two dierent cells and don't allow them to communicate. They give them two choices: confess or not confess. Every strategy prole provide dierent payo, according to the following bimatrix: where the rst/second player chosing the rst row/column choose to confess while chosing the second he decide to do not confess. The solution for this game, using the notion of Nash equilibrium, is (not confess, not confess) whith expected payo 1 for both.
Since every player has the possibility to gain 10, the solution just proposed seems to be not very convenient, even if stable. Let us see what will happen, if the deterrent information would be furnished to the two players.
Let us suppose the a detective in a very bad temper, say to both criminals, after having exposed the classical game, that their possibility to obtain the minimum number of year in prison will decrease according to the same proportional law and, without the possiblity for them to make any agreements, he makes them go in separated cells.
At this point the two prisoners, in possession of the deterrent information (the detective menace), before making any choice, rationally decide to understand the entity of the information reagarding to the game payo. (they complete the information)
Firstly the calculate the hyperplane H equation:
The deterrent furnishes the fundamental information about the coecients kj; since the possibilities decrease for both according to the same proportions, it follows that kj = 1 j = 1, 2. So solving the system we obtain: x1 = x2 that is clearly linear. At this point the two players calculate separated their fj "
x j 1 . . . x j n j −1 "" obtaining:
Now the two players will try the strategy that maximize their own utility function. In gure it is shown the behaviour of such functions: It is evident that maximizing on x1 for the rst and x2 for the second, both player obtain that the optimal strategy is x1 = x2 = 1, since it brings a payo equal to 5 for both. By the theorems exposed in the previous sections, we know that the point M (1, 1) ∈ H is a Nash equilibrium of the temporized game, so it is stable and Pareto-optimal. The temporized solution suggest the use of the strategy x1 = x2 = 1 with an expected payo equals to 5 for both, while the Nash solution suggest the strategy x1 = x2 = 0 with an expected payo equals to 1 for both.
In relation to the superrational concept, let us say something more.
The answer of two superrational player to the prisoner's dilemma, in the classical formulation, is the one to play the strategy x1 = x2 = 1, after making some consideration about the razional faculty of the opponent. In the temporized paradigm, the player's choices do not need any hypothesis regarding the rationality characteristics of the other, but it uses the classical concept of rationality that, by adding the deterrent information, makes the players doing the operations shown in this section to arrive to the conclusions that are identical to the ones obtainable by superrational players, using elements provided by games theory.
Interpretations and applications
The arguments exposed, leave place for many considerations and, interpretations that are free from the specic topic in which they have been formulated. In this section we will discuss a summary exposition of such implications.
Firstly, the temporized solution, unify the best result for a player, with the best result for every player. This property is a consequence of the Pareto-optimality of the solution; in fact the equilibrium point, represents the strategies prole for which every player obtain the maximum from the game, for himself and for the others. It exists a sort of social signicance in the concept of temporized equilibrium, so it is social optimal and in the meanwhile individually optimal. In other words, by chosing the temporized equilibrium, the players can obtain, from the game, the best result for all.
A second consideration regards the importance of the incompleteness of the deterrent information, in fact in the incompleteness of the deterrent stays the needing of the player to build the structure previously exposed, that brings to the calculus of the equilibrium.
We can conclude that it not necessary to give an asymmetric and incomplete information (as in the correlated equilbria theory), but it is sucient to give the players an incomplete information for using the rationality principle in order to obtain alternative solution concepts.
In the previous sections we have demonstrated which are the mathematical mechanisms that induce the players to choose the temporized solution; in this section we give a more philosocal signicance to the deterrent information. It gives to the players a sort of group consciousness, that is observable in the characteristics of hte equilibrium point; this consciousness, even if we are treating non-cooperative games, oblige the players to play strategy prole profoundly related. As we have armed at the beginning of this section, in the temporized solution, the individual maximum coincides with the group maximum and in this property stays the consciousness that we cited previously. The rationality it is not sucient to obtain the personal and global optimum, but it is necessary to have something more. In the model proposed by our theory, this something more is induced by the deterrent. There exist a lot of real example in shich such situation is evident, from social relationships to commercial ones, from religion to politics and so on.
In all the situations in which some entities are in contact to obtain a common solution and in which it is present a trusted supervisor that gives the deterrent information, we are in temporized situation; so back to the previous examples, in social relationships the deterrent may be umanity, in commercial ones, the deterrent may be the control structures, for example, to respect the antitrust laws, in religion it may be god and in politics the deterrent may be represented by the state.
As we have seen the interpretations and the real cases in which we encounter the concept of temporized equilibrium are very common and are part of big a various elds.
The applicative possibilities of the theory of non-cooperative games, are covered by our theory, but dierently from the classical theory, our one build the concept of consciousness/deterrent and so it describes better some situations that are tipical in the social behaviour. The study of G game in temporized context, nds natural applications in the study of solutions concept altertive t the Nash equilibrium.
Some applications, maybe science ctional, could be the study of the choice of punishment systems as an answer to criminal behaviour or the creation of a super entity that should manage juridical relastions between individuals and furnish the deterrent information in order to obtain the best result for the society (that as we have said conicides with the personal best).
Beyond the category of non-cooperative games, our theory cna nd applications in the study of cooperative games; if we assign the meaning of "partecipation to the coalition" to the coecient kj we should characterize the optimal strategies of every player as a part of a coalition.
